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INTRODUCTION
Adrian M. Foley *
The advocate traveling the RICO1 road might well liken his expe-
rience to Dorothy of the Wizard of Oz as she trod down the "yellow
brick road." Examining the strange results in cases across the land,
he might wonder what sort of strange creature he will next encoun-
ter-a strawman, a tinman or, perhaps, the heartless lion. Most
assuredly, he will have seen cases by the dozen in which
"strawmen" are raised early on in decisions, only to be whisked
away in the final result. Then too, he will have seen narrow, brittle,
tin like decisions hewing closely to the most conservative interpreta-
tion of the RICO statute. He may well speculate with others at the
apparent lack of heart that the Supreme Court seems to have for
entering into the RICO fray.
To those of us who have followed closely the development of
Civil RICO from its twelve years of virtual somnolence, followed by
the explosion which has occurred since 1982, the California West-
ern Law Review Symposium promises to be a most timely event.
Civil RICO stands at the crossroads in the ongoing development of
this juggernaut of legal remedies. The full breadth and scope of
actions cognizable under RICO is limited only by the imagination
of aggressive litigators.
In the rapid expansion of RICO litigation, the commercial litiga-
tor seemed at first to be the prime mover in developing novel causes
of action. Thus, almost any matter predicated upon an allegation of
fraud could be molded into a RICO claim and lawyers by the hun-
dreds flocked to outdo each other in structuring causes of action.
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From "prime rate" cases to section 1983 actions, with stops along
the way for security law violations, the course of Civil RICO has
indeed run the gamut.
Similarly, the field of those who have adopted RICO actions has
broadened to include labor lawyers, both on the side of unions and
management, insurance related cases, and class actions of every
nature.
Another area where the dust has hardly settled, and indeed is just
now gathering, is that of the possible use of the injunctive provisions
of RICO. Depending upon the course eventually taken by the
courts, be it narrow, liberal or somewhere in between, the entire
area of RICO's application to the injunctive remedy has the poten-
tial for expanding the use of the statute by geometric proportions.
Courts throughout the country have grappled with the broad
terms of the statute in varying ways. From an early restrictive view
which characterized many lower court decisions, to the more liberal
construction extended by most Appellate courts, the cases indeed
have been the height of inconsistency and have posed serious
problems to lawyers seeking to advise their clients as to predictable
results. The whole body of law continues to grow concerning each
and every element of the statute and indeed it is not too far off the
mark when we look at the cases construing "by reason of" a viola-
tion of section 1962, to say that virtually every phrase of the statute
furnishes an opportunity for judicial interpretation. "Enterprise"
has already attracted the scrupulous attention of judges all over
America with little, if any, consistent results.
Even as the contributors to the Symposium prepare for the task
of constructing signposts along the RICO road, circuit court opin-
ions indicating radical changes from previously established direc-
tions make the seers of RICO less than confident in forecasting the
way of the future for Civil RICO. Probably the most striking exam-
ple of the quandary in which the RICO student finds himself is
found in the recent action of the Second Circuit, when it handed
down a trilogy of cases holding that to sustain an action there must
be a showing that the defendant has previously been convicted of
predicate crimes and that the injury suffered other than that caused
by the predicate crimes must in fact be a separated "racketeering
enterprise" injury. Compounding the problem is the fact that in
each case the court split in its decision.
In what must be deemed a most unusual posture for the Second
Circuit, these cases represented a pointed change of view from the
majority views of other panels of the Court who had earlier held far
more liberal views. The Second Circuit, when called upon to re-
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solve the conflict, amazingly voted 8-3 against en banc considera-
tion of the cases.
While scholars continue to debate the future course of those
cases, the Third Circuit, which had consistently supported the
broader view of RICO, recently (February 1, 1985) reversed and
remanded a district court decision for the plaintiff on a 1962(c)
claim for the reason that the RICO "enterprise" and the corporate
defendant were not distinct entities. Whether this portends a
deeper philosophical change of heart, only time will tell.
The Litigation Section of the American Bar Association and the
Corporation and Business Section have combined their resources in
polling their memberships (almost 100,000 in total) seeking to as-
certain the views of practitioners in the RICO field as to their opin-
ion of the rapid growth of RICO and specifically whether legislative
changes should be sought.
Classic evidence of the need for the exchange of ideas which this
Symposium promotes can be found in the actions of other interested
parties.
The Office of Legal Policy of the United States Department of
Justice is in the midst of an in depth study as to the status and
future of both civil and criminal RICO. Civil RICO also received
the close attention of "The Vice President's Task Group on the
Regulation of Financial Services." In their report, after noting that
"RICO is attractive to litigants because it provides treble damages
and attorney fees that are unavailable under banking or security
laws and due to the breadth and ambiguity of the statute," it went
on to state, "consequently, the Task Group recommendations
would limit the application of the civil penalty provisions of RICO
to prevent their misuse by private parties in cases solely involving
legitimate business activities by financial institutions."
Deputy Attorney General Carol E. Dinkins, in a recent address
delivered at the University of Houston Law Center described the
RICO statute as "one of the most important and controversial
weapons in the government's legal arsenal and in the legal arsenal
of private plaintiffs." She went on to note that the statute is one
which is extremely powerful because of its broad substantive reach.
Until the Supreme Court enters the fray of Civil RICO, it is safe
to say that the turbulent RICO waters will continue to boil
unabated.
All litigators look forward with great interest to the work of the




Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
